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Macroeconomists, development scholars, and policy makers have long recognized the importance of 
poverty traps as a mayor cause of persistent inequality and a serious limitation to growth. A poverty trap 
may be defined as a threshold level below which individuals or households will not increase their well-
being despite the conditions of the economy. While the importance of poverty traps is widely accepted, 
their microfoundations (the rationality) behind them are not very well understood.  Under the Mexican 
setting, this paper contributes in two ways. First, we assume that income depends on the capital (both 
physical and human) that a household posses. Hence, if a household is poor and it is not able to accumulate 
capital it will remain poor (unless there is a sudden increase to the returns of its existing capital). Thus a 
poverty trap will be generated. Following Chavas (2004, 2005) we explicitly model the preferences, 
consumption, and the physical and human capital accumulation of Mexican households. We argue that the 
typical dynamic model with additive utilities and constant discount rates will not be able to capture poverty 
traps. The reason is that survival motives are involved (endogenous discounting is needed). Second, 
employing the same model, we test the impact of the Mexican government most important social policy 
program (Progresa-Oportunidades), in alleviating poverty traps. In the case of households with youngsters, 
this program can provide funds conditioned on kids attending school. This will somehow, force the 
participants to increase their human capital. A comparison between households in the programs versus non 
participants should shed some light in the effectiveness of the program and the sensitivity of persistent 
poverty to cash transfers. 
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∗ hjvp@itesm.mx I. Introduction 
This paper examines the linkages between poverty and the incentives to invest and 
accumulate capital. To the extent that accumulations of physical and human capital are a 
crucial part of the process of economic growth, its absence can generate poverty traps. 
The analysis presented below is at the household level, both consumption and investment 
decisions are explicitly modeled. Investment in physical capital and human capital is 
separated, given that they may follow independent paths. Instead of considering the 
standard model of additive intertemporal utilities with exogenous discounting, this study 
employs a more general specification where the discounting is endogenous to the model. 
The latter would help to explain why investment decisions between rich and poor are 
different, and not only dependent upon credit rationing (Berti 2001). 
  Another contribution of the paper is that the effects of two different social 
programs on household capital accumulation will be evaluated. Both consist of cash 
transfers, however one is conditional on certain household behaviors, and the other is 
almost unconditional.  
  The paper is organized in the following way. In Section II the model is presented. 
The limitations of additive intertemporal household preferences with exogenous 
discounting are exposed, and a more general approach motivated. An econometrically 
tractable reduced form specification is derived from the model. Section III describes the 
data, and how the variables were constructed. In Section IV the characteristics of the two 
Mexican social programs relevant for this study are discussed. Section V presents the 
econometric results, for the pure model and the model with the effects of the social programs included. A brief analysis of the results and its implications is included in this 
part. Finally, Section VI concludes.  
II. The Model 
This paper employs a model developed in (Chavas 2004, 2005). 
   The standard economic model specifying intertemporal household preferences as 
the present value of future utilities is: 
2
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where xt denotes the consumption bundle at time t, ut(xt) is the utility obtained at time t, 
and β is a discount factor satisfying 0 < β < 1, t=1,2,…Two important assumptions stem 
from (1): first, the utility function embedded in (1) is additive over time, and second, the 
discounting of the future is done at a exogenous rate β. 
  Despite its convenience, the additive utility function (1) is not capable of 
capturing the essence of extreme poverty issues.  Notice it implies  ' [/] / tt Ux x 0 ∂ ∂∂∂ =  
for all t ≠t’. Thus the marginal utility of consumption is independent of consumption at 
other periods. Given that survival issues are involved in extreme poverty, current 
consumption
1 must affect the marginal utility of future consumption. 
A recursive specification of household preferences can be set as: 
1 ( , ,...) ( , ( ,...)), tt t t UV x x U x V x + == 1 +                                                                              (2) 
where  is non-satiated in  1 ( , ( ,...)) tt UxVx + t x , and 0/ UV1 ≤ ∂∂ < . Specification (2) is a 
generalization of (1). Since (2) allows  ' / t Ux ∂ ∂ to depend on  t x for t’ >t, it allows current 
consumption to affect the marginal utility of future consumption, thus permitting to 
capture survival issues. The discount factor  / UV ∂ ∂ will vary with economic conditions. 
                                                 
1 At least for food, but other necessities may very well be considered (e.g. medicines).  For example if the consumption of food and other necessities is very low and threatens 
survival, it will affect how the household views the future and a very low discount factor 
can be anticipated, i.e.  . The intuition is that concerns for survival make poor 
household focus attention on short term decisions sacrificing longer term payoffs. 
/ UV ∂∂ ≈ 0
t z
Given recursive preferences, the decisions of the household in terms of both consumption 
and investment can be solved via backward induction. Let kt be the vector of physical and 
human capital of the household, it evolves over time according the state equation: 
1 (, ) tt t kf k + =⋅ + ,                                                                                                              (3) 
where [ ( , ) ]/ tt t t f kk ⋅− k is the natural growth rate of capital (depreciation rate if negative), 
and zt is the amount of household investments (disinvestment if negative) made at time t.
2
At time t both physical and human capital generate a gross return denoted by  ( , ) tt gk⋅ . 
The market price vector of consumer goods xt  is pt>0, and qt≥0 the unit price vector of 
investments zt. Consequently the household budget constraint at time t is: 
(, ) tt t t tt p xg k q z ≤⋅ − ,                                                                                                          (4) 
Using backward induction, optimal behavior is given by the functional equation (see 
Streufert 1990, 1992; Becker and Boyd 1997): 
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where  is the value function at time t.  ( ) tt Wk
The optimal decisions rules in (5) can be denoted by: 
 
2 A negative kt can represent asset liquidation or borrowing in the capital markets. ** (,,) , tt t t t x x pqk =                                                                                                               (6) 
for consumption, and by 
** (,,) , tt t t t z z pqk =                                                                                                                (7) 
for investment; completing the characterization of the household behavior. 
Poverty and Household Investment 
In this section how poverty may have a negative influence on investent
3 is explored. 
Under differentiability and assuming an interior solution, the first order conditions 
necessary to solve (5) are: 
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where λt > 0 is the marginal utility of income. Applying the envelope theorem to (5), the 
marginal of utility of capital is: 
11 1 /( / ) (/ ) ( / ) ( / tt t t t t t Wk UV W k fk gk ) , t λ ++ + ∂∂ = ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂∂                                           (10) 
The marginal utility of capital can be decomposed in two parts: the discounted marginal 
utility of capital growth  , and the marginal utility of 
income generated by capital 
11 1 (/ ) ( / ) ( / tt t UV W k fk ++ + ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ) t
( / ) tt t gk λ ∂∂. 
  For the moment, assuming xt does not affect gross income gt, household income at 
time t can be defined as:   ( ) tt t t t I gk q z =−  . Thus from the household decision problem 
(5), the consumption decision (6) conditional on income becomes: 
** (,,) , tt t t t x xp Ik
+ =                                                                                                             (11) 
                                                 
3 Chavas (2005) derives two applications of his model: first he explores how malnutrition may affect 
productivity, second he analyzes the effect of malnutrition on investment. In this study we stick to the 
latter, keeping the former idea for future research.        
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where 
** () (,,) tt tt t t t t I gk q z pqk =− . Chavas (2005) distinguishes between the two 
representations (11) and (12). While (12) is a reduced form, (11) is a more structural form 
that isolates the effects of household income.  
  In order to understand the generation of a poverty trap, consider the case of very 
poor households. Given their low income they face poverty and survival problems, this 
implies limited incentives to invest. Without investment, the household stands small 
chances of accumulating capital. If there are not accumulations of physical or human 
capital, their income streams will not grow over time. Thus a vicious circle is generated, 
due in part by endogenous discounting.  
III. The Empirical Environment 
The main source of data for this paper comes from INEGI (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica Geografia e Informatica), who collects a household income-expenditure 
survey called ENIGH (Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares).  These 
surveys include a set of disaggregated consumption data, and other variables such as 
income and socio-demographic characteristics. All the information was collected using a 
combination of the “booklet method” and daily interviews. ENIGH 2002 was employed, 
obtaining a sample of 17,168 households. 
  In order to keep the demand system tractable, the vector x
* was divided in two: 
food items and non-food items. Aggregation was dealt via the employment of a Törquist 
price index. The left hand side variables (quantities) were obtained by diving total 
expenditures in the category by the price index. The variable capital was divided into 
physical and human capital. Physical capital was inferred utilizing imputed rents and the returns to financial assets of the household.
4 Human capital was defined as the amount of 
school years studied by the members of the household. The vector z
* was defined by the 
current investment in physical capital (e.g. financial assets) while investment in human 
capital was defined as how many people in the household were currently attending 
school. The price of acquiring human capital can be obtained by dividing the total 
expenditures of the household in education by quantity. The price of physical capital is 
one (i.e. like depositing one dollar). While this is correct from an economic point of view, 
econometrically the price effect of physical capital would not be identifiable; it cannot be 
separated from the intercept.  
  Notice that all the variables for (6-7) have been specified. Thus a four system 
equation can be estimated, two for consumption (x
*) and two for investment (z
*). A final 
issue to be considered in this section is that the distribution of investment in human 
capital is truncated at zero. While it is possible to disinvest physical capital, people 
cannot get de-educated. In order to deal with the truncated variable in a system of 
equation the CTS estimator proposed by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) would be employed.   
IV. The effects of two social programs on household’s capital accumulation 
Social programs pursue two highly interconnected objectives: on the one hand they may 
try to alleviate urgent needs. These may include food safety, health problems, emergency 
shelter, and related survival issues. The second objective, which usually aspires to longer 
term effects deals with the reduction of poverty and welfare improvements.  Given the 
model presented in section II, a sensible question is to what extent social programs 
incentive the accumulation of capital among poor and extreme poor people. If they do 
contribute to investment, then they can be good instruments to solve poverty traps. 
                                                 
4 A return of ½% per month was assumed.   Within the Mexican setting we investigate to of the most important social 
programs of the Mexican government: Procampo and Progresa/Oportunidades. Procampo 
is a program whose target group is rural producers. It was created with the purpose of 
controlling the effects of NAFTA on the production of some basic crops (corn, beans, 
wheat, rice, barley, soybeans, sorghum, cotton and cardamom).
5 The program defines 
“qualifying land” as those hectares that sometime between 1991 and 1993 where 
employed to plant any of the enumerated crops. The owner (or responsible in the case of 
“ejidos” (communal land)) of any hectare of qualifying land now employed to plant 
crops, raise livestock, forestry or associated to approved environmental programs, can 
receive a direct cash transfer. The transfer is of around 80 USD per hectare per cycle 
(there are two agricultural cycles per year). This program has been defines as “a hybrid 
[program] between compensation, welfare and adjustment, defined in the context of a 
political window of opportunity to compensate the losers of trade liberalization, but with 
a definite welfare twist toward the rural poor”, (Sadoulet et al. 2001).   
  Progresa/Oportunidades is a program that targets directly the poorest families in 
the country. At the beginning it was limited to rural households, nowadays urban 
households are also included but in a smaller proportion.
6 The program consists of two 
basic elements: a health component and an education component. In the case of the health 
part of the program, conditional on regular check-ups the household receives some 
nutritional supplements and a cash transfer. In the case of households with children in 
                                                 
5 A detailed explanation of the program can be found at http://www.procampo.gob.mx. 
6 Under 2002 data approximately 40% of the rural population participates in the program, compared with 
around 5% of urban population.  school age, they received cash transfers that vary according to age and gender of the kids, 
conditional on school attendance.
7   
V. Results  
The first results concern the estimation of the reduced form system (6-7). The four 
equations: food consumption, non-food consumption, physical capital investment and 
human capital investment where regressed
8 on the stocks of physical and human capital, 
and the prices of food items, non-food items, and human capital (education). As 
explained in section III it is not possible to identify the prices of physical capital, so their 
effect is embedded with the intercept. Table 1 summarizes the results. 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error 
Food     intercept  35.517025 2.142506 
             physical capital  0.000340 0.000346 
             human capital  0.827944 0.015875 
             food prices  -0.152818 0.003042 
             Non-food prices  0.002204 0.000746 
             human cap. Prices  0.001751 0.000074 
Non-food  intercept 19.492776 0.251655 
             physical capital  0.000239 0.000034 
             human capital  0.134437 0.003860 
             Food prices  0.003845 0.001575 
             Non-food prices  -0.007292 0.000085 
             human cap. Prices  0.001222 0.000017 
Inv. Physical Capital inter.  -319.402982 1792.792700 
             physical capital  -1.434243 0.007112 
             human capital  43.967791 7.259170 
             Food prices  -2.695722 1.429914 
             Non-food prices  0.162986 0.631289 
             human cap. Prices  -0.162709 0.022250 
Inv. Human Capital inter.  2.691026 0.065975 
             physical capital  -0.000062 0.000022 
             human capital  0.002547 0.000505 
                                                 
7 Skoufias and Parker (2001) provide a good description of the program and comment on some of its 
effects, Schultz (2004) provides an evaluation of the program and linkages to development policy, Cho 
(2004) presents an evaluation and the effects of possible modifications to its current format. 
8 ML estimation using GAUSS/GAUSSX.              Food prices  -0.000292 0.000123 
             Non-food prices  0.000034 0.000024 
             human cap. Prices  0.000010 0.000005 
     Censoring correction  -1.882893 0.042460 
Table 1. Bold characters are significant at the 95% level. Estimation with the full sample (n=17,183 
households). 
 
  With respect to consumption physical capital appears to have a statistical 
significant effect over consumption of non-food items, but not on food. The stock of 
human capital on the other hand, is significant in explaining the consumption of both 
food and non-food items. The prices in both equations have the expect sign: a negative 
own-price effect, while the coefficients of the other prices are positive. 
  Some complex patterns appear in the investment decisions. First while human 
capital stock correlates positively with both physical and human capital investment,   
physical capital has a negative effect. The human capital effect may accentuate poverty 
traps. In the case of physical capital stock a possible explanation and venue for further 
research is a cohort effect. For example older people have a smaller probability of having 
children, thus are less prone to invest in human capital. Also, given their life cycle stage 
they may be consuming part of their assets, with disinvestment showing up. In the case of 
food prices, they appear to have a negative impact on both physical and human capital 
investments. The linkages with poverty traps are direct, since higher food prices may 
hinder the accumulation of resources. The prices of non-food items are not statistically 
significant in either equation. The price of education has a negative effect on physical 
capital investment, and a positive effect on human capital investment.
9  
Social Programs’ Effects in Household Capital Accumulation 
                                                 
9 As will be discussed later in the paper, once the sample is limited to households with children, the signs of 
these effects flip, becoming the expected ones. A problem when dealing with social programs that make cash transfers in a reduced form 
specification is that endogeneity issues may arise, (in order how to solve them see for 
example Dhar et al. 2003). Ideally it would be desirable to perform GMM estimation, 
conditioned on having the proper instruments. With all its limitation the simplest 
approach will be followed in order to shed some light on the effects of the programs in 
the household’s investment decisions. The procedure will consist in building two 
dummies: each will take the value of one (zero otherwise) if the household receives a 
transfer from either PROCAMPO or Progresa/Oportunidades, respectively. Each of these 
dummies will be included in the investment equations (7). 
  The system (6-7) was estimated with the inclusion of the dummies that accounted 
participation in both social programs. Magnitudes and signs of the previously observed 
parameters remained close to the original regression.
10 The results were that neither 
program has a significant statistical effect in physical capital investment. On the other 
hand, PROCAMPO was not significant in the accumulation of human capital, but 
Progresa/Oportunidades was both statistically and economically significant in explaining 
the investment in education. 
  In order to check the robustness of the specification, the model was estimated on 
two subsamples. The first subsample consisted of all households with at least one person 
“on school age”, defined as below 23 years. The program’s effect did not changed: 
PROCAMPO was not significant for either physical or human capital accumulation, 
while Progresa/Oportunidades was significant for education investments, but not for 
physical capital.     
                                                 
10 In order to control for space they are not reported here, but they can be provided upon request.   The last subsample consisted on households with persons on school age (defined 
as above), but that where also below an arbitrary income line. The criterion was to set this 
line at 2 USD per day per household member. The intuition is similar to that of a poverty 
line, however it was an arbitrary cut-off point. For physical capital investments the results 
were not different qualitatively as from the previous regressions. In the case of human 
capital accumulation, Progresa/Oportunidades was significant and positive as in the 
previous runs, and PROCAMPO if any had a negative effect (the coefficient was -0.1025 
with a standard error of 0.0554). 
  An important difference between the two programs and which may be the driving 
effect behind the results found, is that while PROCAMPO is in practical terms a program 
with unconditional transfers, Progresa/Oportunidades conditions its transfers to specific 
household behaviors. In the case of very poor households while unconditional cash 
transfers would have a welfare effect, they may not induce capital accumulation. As 
(Chavas 2005) points out, concerns for survival make poor households focus on short 
term issues, sacrificing longer term economic payoffs.   
VI. Conclusions 
This paper argues that when poverty is present, the classic representation of intertemporal 
additive utilities with exogenous discounting may be incorrect. Endogenous discounting 
is needed to reflect survival/extreme poverty issues. Moreover a household may discount 
the future so heavily that below certain threshold level they would never accumulate 
capital, thus their income would stay very low and a poverty trap is generated. 
  Consumption and investment decisions at the household level were explicitly 
modeled and estimated via a reduced form specification. The results showed that investment and consumption are linked through the prices of both goods and assets. For 
example, the price of food had a direct negative effect on investment on both physical 
and human capital, with poor households showing more vulnerable. Ceteris paribus, 
better endowed in terms of human capital households are investing more in physical 
capital and education, thus inequality and poverty could present high persistence. 
  Within the reduced form specification, the effects on capital accumulation of two 
social programs are tested. PROCAMPO a social program whose only restriction is that 
“qualifying” land be used for an agricultural activity does not seem to have any 
significant effect on the accumulation of physical or human capital. It may even affect 
negatively the human capital accumulation of very poor households. On the other hand, 
Progresa/Oportunidades whose cash transfers are conditional on school attendance and/or 
participating in health check-ups has a significant influence in human capital 
accumulation (but not on physical capital investment).  These results suggest that 
unconditional cash transfers may improve welfare and alleviate poverty in the short run, 
but may be inadequate to incentive capital accumulation and as an aid in breaking 
poverty traps. With heavy future discounting and limited cash transfers, programs may 
need the participating restrictions in order to induce capital accumulation.  
  Two immediate objectives appear for future research. First as previously 
mentioned, this study is utilizing a reduced form specification. A more structural 
specification, where income is treated as an endogenous variable may shed more light on 
the household’s decision process. Second, measuring the effects of extreme poverty on 
productivity may contribute to a better design of complementary programs that may alleviate urgent needs. This can create better incentives for poor households to focus on 
longer run opportunities. 
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